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PRESUMING PATENT INVENTORSHIP WITHOUT




IN DRONE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. PARROT S.A., the FederalCircuit held that courts need not conduct a substantive exami-
nation of patent inventorship to decide standing issues in in-
fringement cases where the plaintiff’s claim to title is not
otherwise in dispute.1 The court stated that “while ownership
and inventorship are related concepts, they involve separate in-
quiries.”2 But, it failed to recognize the importance of determin-
ing inventorship to confirm that the plaintiff has standing to
sue. To have standing under Article III of the Constitution, a
plaintiff must show they have suffered an “injury in fact,” which,
in infringement cases, is “when a party infringes a patent in vio-
lation of a party’s exclusionary rights.”3
However, the court ignored how the standing rule applies in
infringement suits brought by a patent assignee. In such suits,
examining whether the patent rights passed from the sole inven-
tor to the assignee should be a preliminary issue that the court
decides as it determines whether the assignee possesses an “ex-
clusionary right.”4 If the patent rights did not pass from the sole
inventor, the assignee has no exclusionary right and thus would
have an injury in fact necessary to establish standing.5
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2019; B.S., University of
Texas, May 2016. The author would like to thank his parents, Rhonda and Greg,
his brothers, and his friends for all of their support and encouragement.
1 Drone Techs., Inc. v. Parrot S.A., 838 F.3d 1283, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
2 Id. at 1293.
3 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2; Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1292; see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
4 Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1306–07 (Newman, J., concurring).
5 Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
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The majority’s decision will increase the likelihood that courts
will reach the merits of patent infringement claims. This can
have both a beneficial and harmful effect on aerospace compa-
nies. On the one hand, it could mean that aerospace companies
as patent assignees have a better chance of receiving favorable
judgments in cases where they might otherwise have been dis-
missed. On the other hand, the decision could also expose aero-
space companies to more potential liability in patent
infringement cases where patent assignees have brought an ac-
tion against them.
Drone Technologies, Inc. v. Parrot S.A. involved two patents
owned by Drone Technologies (Drone).6 Yu-Tuan Lee (Ms.
Lee), the named inventor on the patents, assigned them to
Drone.7 The patents dealt with systems for remote-controlled
machines.8 At the time of invention, remote-controlled systems
had two components: “a remote-controlled device . . . and a
handheld device with a control stick.”9 Under this system, move-
ment was only controlled in two directions.10 The patents solved
the weakness by “providing a system that enables a user to syn-
chronize the movement of a remote-controlled device with the
movement of a remote controller.”11
Parrot S.A. (Parrot) is a drone designer, developer, and mar-
keter that offered two types of drones in the United States: the
AR.Drone and the AR.Drone 2.0.12 Parrot also offers a “FreeF-
light” application, which is a software that consumers “could
download and install on a touchscreen device . . . to pilot a Par-
rot drone.”13 Parrot drones require source code for their opera-
tion, and Parrot “uses source code for the FreeFlight application
. . . and separate source code for the drone itself.”14
Drone sued Parrot, alleging that Parrot indirectly infringed
on its patents by virtue of Parrot’s customers’ actions.15 Drone
claimed that once Parrot’s customers downloaded and imple-
mented the FreeFlight application to pilot their drones, as Par-
6 Id. at 1288.
7 Id. at 1290.
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rot instructed, the patents were infringed upon.16 The Western
District of Pennsylvania entered a default judgment against Par-
rot as to liability.17 After a jury trial on damages, Drone was
awarded $7.8 million.18
After the default judgment, Parrot moved to dismiss Drone’s
claim for lack of standing, asserting that Drone did not have
complete ownership.19 Parrot argued that Bruce Ding (Mr.
Ding) was the true inventor, not Ms. Lee.20 Parrot emphasized
that Ms. Lee testified, “I came up with this idea about having the
aircraft move following the motion of the remote controller,”
but she also stated, “I only came up with the ideas, and subse-
quently Bruce told me that there was such a chip that could de-
tect movement.”21
The Western District of Pennsylvania denied the motion, find-
ing that the record “sufficiently supported Ms. Lee’s claim to be
a properly named inventor and that it did not demonstrate that
Mr. Ding [was] at least a co-inventor.”22 Therefore, the court
concluded that Drone had standing.23
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: MAJORITY PRESUMES
INVENTORSHIP BASED ON FACE OF THE
PATENT WITHOUT FURTHER
EXAMINATION
The majority stated that for a court to have jurisdiction over
an infringement suit, plaintiffs must have both Article III stand-
ing and standing under the Patent Act.24 Under the Patent Act,
a “patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement”
and “‘patentee’ includes successors in title to the patentee.”25
The dispute was, in assessing standing, whether the court should
(1) “presume that Ms. Lee is correctly named as the sole inven-
tor,” or (2) confirm that she was, in fact, the sole inventor.26 The
majority emphasized the “‘presumption that [a patent’s] named
16 Id.




21 Id. at 1306 (Newman, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 1291.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1292; see generally U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2; 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (2012); 35
U.S.C. § 281 (2012).
25 35 U.S.C. § 100(d); 35 U.S.C. § 281.
26 Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1292.
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inventors are the true and only inventors.’”27 There was no dis-
pute that Ms. Lee was the sole named inventor or that she as-
signed Drone her interests.28 This satisfied standing, and the
court did not examine whether Ms. Lee was, in fact, the sole
inventor.29 This was because “another avenue exists for [Parrot]
to challenge inventorship” by “raise[ing]the defense that a pat-
ent is invalid for failing to name the correct inventors.”30
The court concluded that Parrot did not cite any authority
that suggested that the court must conduct “a substantive exami-
nation of inventorship . . . to resolve an issue of standing in an
infringement action where the plaintiff’s claim to title is not oth-
erwise in dispute.”31 The court distinguished cases Parrot cited
on the basis that, in those cases, the court addressed ownership,
not inventorship, to confirm standing.32 Because Ms. Lee was the
named inventor, the court presumed this was correct without
determining whether she was the true inventor. Thus, when she
assigned her ownership interest, Drone attained complete own-
ership and had standing.
III. CONCURRENCE: COURTS MUST DETERMINE
INVENTORSHIP AS A THRESHOLD ISSUE BECAUSE
INVENTORSHIP AFFECTS OWNERSHIP
Concurring Judge Newman disagreed with the court’s deci-
sion that it was unnecessary to conduct a substantive examina-
tion to determine that Ms. Lee was, in fact, the patents’ true
inventor.33 Judge Newman relied on Beech Aircraft Corporation v.
EDO Corporation for the notion that a patent assignee’s owner-
ship of the patent inherently depends on who initially invented
the patent and, thus, who had the authority to assign the pat-
ent.34 In Beech Aircraft, the Federal Circuit held that “[a]t the
heart of any ownership analysis lies the question of who first in-
vented the subject matter at issue, because the patent right ini-
tially vests in the inventor who may then, barring any restrictions
27 Id. (quoting Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc., 253 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1292–93.
31 Id. at 1293.
32 Id. at 1293–94.
33 Id. at 1306 (Newman, J., concurring).
34 Id. at 1306–07 (Newman, J., concurring).
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to the contrary, transfer that right to another.”35 Thus, “[a]n in-
correct inventor or inventive entity cannot pass title by assign-
ment, because that entity has no title to pass.”36
Therefore, under Judge Newman’s view, inventorship must be
determined in order to establish whether the patent assignee
obtained lawful title to the patent so as to attain ownership
rights.37 This viewpoint may have been outcome determinative
in this case. The Federal Circuit has held that “one who merely
suggests an idea . . . rather than means of accomplishing it, is
not a joint inventor.”38 As such, because Ms. Lee herself said that
she was only suggesting an idea, and that it was really Mr. Ding
that did the rest, it would appear that Ms. Lee would not, in fact,
be a joint inventor.39 This would mean that she could not assign
the rights to the patent to Drone because she would have had
no legal right to assign in the first instance.40
IV. THE CONCURRENCE EMPLOYS THE CORRECT
FRAMEWORK BECAUSE INVENTORSHIP
AFFECTS OWNERSHIP
The concurrence employs the correct analytical framework in
determining, at the outset of patent infringement cases where
patent rights have been transferred, whether a patent assignee
has the requisite standing to sue for infringement.41 The major-
ity correctly points out that that plaintiff must establish an injury
in fact to establish Article III standing, and this occurs “when a
party infringes a patent in violation of a party’s exclusionary
rights.”42 However, the majority ignores that in order for a party
to possess an exclusionary right in a patent infringement case,
the party must possess full and complete ownership of the pat-
ent at issue. Indeed, “plaintiffs that hold all legal rights to the
patent as the patentee or assignee of all patent rights—the en-
tire bundle of sticks” have standing to sue for infringement.43
And when a patentee “transfers ‘all substantial rights’ to the pat-
35 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d. 1248, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
36 Drone Techs. Inc., 838 F.3d at 1307 (Newman, J., concurring).
37 Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
38 Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A. Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970)).
39 Drone Techs. Inc., 838 F.3d at 1306 (Newman, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 1307 (Newman, J., concurring).
41 See id. (Newman, J., concurring).
42 Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1292.
43 Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added).
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ent, this amounts to an assignment or a transfer of title, which
confers constitutional standing on the assignee to sue for in-
fringement in its own name alone.”44 It follows that for a patent
assignee to hold all legal rights to the patent, there must have
been a valid transfer of title of those rights.
In his concurrence, Judge Newman pointed out that “[a]n in-
correct inventor . . . cannot pass title by assignment, because
that entity has no title to pass.”45 Thus, the court should deter-
mine, at the outset, whether the named inventor was, in fact, the
sole inventor.46 This impacts whether the inventor had title to
pass. If the named inventor is not the sole inventor, then she did
not have all legal rights to the patent and could not assign own-
ership rights.
Admittedly, the majority correctly asserted that “while owner-
ship and inventorship are related concepts, they involve sepa-
rate inquiries.”47 However, inventorship ultimately decides who
legally owns the patent after an assignment. “An incorrect inven-
tor cannot pass title by assignment.”48 Therefore, if an assignee
attains title from an incorrect inventor, they do not own all legal
rights since the inventor did not have title to pass.49 Thus,
“[i]nventorship affects not only the validity of the patent, but
also ownership and transfer of ownership.”50
The majority did not examine whether the named inventor
on the patent is, in fact, the sole inventor because Parrot did not
“advance a persuasive reason for not accepting” the presump-
tion that a patent’s named inventors are the true inventors.51 In
distinguishing cases Parrot cited for the proposition that this
analysis is necessary to determine standing, the majority did not
extend the analysis to determine original inventorship,52 even
though it affects “ownership and transfer of ownership.”53
The decision not to conduct a substantive examination of in-
ventorship may allow assignees to sue for infringement even
44 Id. at 1340 (quoting Intellectual Prop. Dev. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., 248
F.3d 1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
45 Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1307 (Newman, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 1293 (Newman, J., concurring).
47 Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 1307 (Newman, J., concurring).
49 Id.; Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
50 Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1306 (Newman, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 1292.
52 Id. at 1293–94.
53 Id. at 1306 (Newman, J., concurring).
2018] CASE NOTE 187
when they do not have full patent ownership.54 This may lead to
more infringement suits brought by assignees who do not have
full ownership rights.55 This in turn creates judicial economy is-
sues, as courts will conduct a full analysis of the merits of com-
plex infringement claims even though the court may not have
jurisdiction to reach the merits because the assignee lacked
standing.56 Furthermore, if courts can reach the merits of patent
infringement suits where the assignee did not completely own
the patent rights, the courts would be exercising power beyond
their constitutional limits by deciding cases outside their juris-
diction.57 As the Supreme Court emphasized, “The requirement
that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘springs
from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United
States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’”58
By not requiring courts to examine the true inventorship of
the patent, especially in infringement suits brought by assignees,
the majority creates issues involving judicial efficiency and abuse
of power.59 To avoid this, courts should follow Judge Newman’s
framework and determine at the outset whether the patent as-
signees obtained title to the patent rights from the true and sole
inventor, as that affects whether the assignee possesses all legal
rights to the patent.60
V. THIS ISSUE IMPACTS WHEN AEROSPACE COMPANIES
CAN BOTH SUE AS PATENT ASSIGNEES AND BE
SUED BY PATENT ASSIGNEES
Due to the prevalence of patents in the aerospace industry,
the framework courts apply to determine standing for patent in-
fringement could have a big impact on aerospace companies.
Again, whether courts conduct a substantive examination of in-
ventorship in infringement cases brought by assignees deter-
mines when assignees have standing to sue for infringement.61
54 See id. (Newman, J., concurring).
55 See id. (Newman, J., concurring).
56 See Rodrick J. Coffey, Giving a Hoot About an Owl Does Not Satisfy the Interest
Requirement for Intervention: The Misapplication of Intervention as of Right in Coalition
of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth v. The Depart-
ment of the Interior, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 823–24 (1998).
57 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998).
58 Id.
59 Coffey, supra note 56, at 824; see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94–95.
60 Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1306–07 (Newman, J., concurring).
61 Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
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According to PatSnap, an intellectual property analytics firm,
“The major manufacturers in the aerospace and defense indus-
tries have a total of 29,139 granted patents and 29,215 patent
applications distributed into 22,345 patent families” as of April
2017.62 Boeing, Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin own the most
patents in the industry.63 Because new innovation and technol-
ogy is widely used in the aerospace industry, an increased num-
ber of infringement suits may be filed in the coming years.64
These suits may be brought by aerospace companies as patent
assignees or by patent assignees that sue aerospace companies
for infringement. In either case, the way courts determine stand-
ing could influence when aerospace companies have standing to
sue for infringement as assignees or when assignees have stand-
ing to sue them.65
With the majority’s framework, more patent assignees will
have standing.66 This presents a double-edged sword for aero-
space companies, depending on their party status in infringe-
ment cases, because more cases will reach the merits.67 As
plaintiff/patent assignees, aerospace companies could see an in-
crease in favorable judgments since their claims are more likely
to reach the merits.68 Conversely, as defendant/alleged infring-
ers, these companies could possibly be subject to more liability
as more adverse infringement claims reach the merits, especially
now that there is a relaxed standard for proving willful
infringement.69
With Judge Newman’s framework, more infringement suits
would be dismissed for lack of standing.70 In fact, it seems the
infringement claim in Drone Technologies would have fallen victim
to Newman’s analysis.71 Ms. Lee testified that she “came up with
this idea” but she “only came up with the ideas, and . . . Bruce
62 Industrial Innovation: Aerospace & Defence Manufacturers, PATSNAP, http://
www.patsnap.com/resources/industry-innovation-reports/aerospace-defence
[https://perma.cc/B8LJ-LBHV] (last updated Apr. 19, 2017).
63 Id.
64 See John Coykendall, Aerospace Innovation—A New Dawn, DELOITTE, at 2 (Dec.
2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/manufacturing/articles/us-
aerospace-innovation-a-new-dawn.html [https://perma.cc/6MXW-6BDB].
65 See Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1306–07 (Newman, J., concurring).
66 See Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Products, Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
67 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
68 See id.
69 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016).
70 See Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1306 (Newman, J., concurring).
71 See id. at 1306–07 (Newman, J., concurring).
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told [her] that there was such a chip that could detect move-
ment.”72 “[O]ne who merely suggests an idea . . . rather than
means of accomplishing it, is not a joint inventor.”73 Thus, the
inventorship analysis was outcome determinative.74 This issue
could impact many other patent infringement cases in the aero-
space industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority erred by declining to substantively examine in-
ventorship and by accepting that the named inventor on the pat-
ent is the sole inventor. The majority ignored that inventorship
affects whether an assignee obtained complete patent rights by
assignment.75 If assignees do not own all legal rights to the pat-
ent, they have no exclusionary right that can be violated in in-
fringement suits.76 Without an exclusionary right, there is no
injury in fact to establish standing.77 The decision presents judi-
cial economy issues due to more infringement claims reaching
the merits when they can be dismissed for lack of standing.78
Finally, courts may now employ extrajudicial authority by reach-
ing the merits in cases they do not have jurisdiction over.79
The majority’s analysis leaves aerospace companies with a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, more of their claims as
plaintiff/patent assignees are likely to reach the merits, increas-
ing the likelihood that they receive a favorable judgment.80 On
the other hand, as defendant/alleged infringers, they may be-
come subject to more liability as patent infringers.81 Because
patents are so prevalent in the industry, it will be interesting to
see the majority decision’s effect.
72 Id. at 1306 (Newman, J., concurring).
73 Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A. Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970)).
74 See Drone Techs., Inc., 838 F.3d at 1306 (Newman, J., concurring).
75 See id. (Newman, J., concurring).
76 See id. (Newman, J., concurring).
77 See id. (Newman, J., concurring).
78 Coffey, supra note 56, at 823–24.
79 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998).
80 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975).
81 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016).
